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ARGUMENT

WWC Holding Co., Inc. ("Western Wireless") files this Reply Brief in response to
the briefs of the Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") and the Utah Rural
Telephone Association ("URTA"). 1

All parties agree that the Commission had a

responsibility to conduct a balancing test to determine whether the public interest was
met by designating Western Wireless as an additional eligible telecommunications carrier
("ETC") in the areas served by the affected URTA companies. Western Wireless filed a
clear and specific challenge to the findings and conclusions that impacted the
Commission's balancing test. In doing so Western Wireless presented narrow issues for
appeal:
1.

Should the Commission have found that designating Western Wireless as
an additional ETC will bring public interest benefits of competition,
increased subscribership, larger local calling areas, and mobility? The
answer is clearly "yes" based on the undisputed record evidence.

2.

Whether the Commission lawfully considered in its public interest
determination the possibility the State Fund might increase in size with the
designation of Western Wireless? The answer to this legal question is
clearly "no" as a matter of federal and state law.

Once the Court corrects the Commission's errors stated in the Order, several public
interest benefits will weigh in favor of Westem Wireless' designation, and no detriments
will weigh against the designation.

A balancing of these factors clearly compels the

conclusion that the public interest is served by designating Western Wireless as an ETC
in each of the URTA companies' service areas.
Western Wireless' Initial Brief is cited as "WW Br.," The Commission's Brief is cited
as "Com. Br," and URTA's Brief is cited as "URTA Br."

1

Rather than respond to these specific appeal issues, the Commission and URTA
wade through the entire record and seek to re-litigate the entire case. They rely on
arguments previously made to the Commission rather than what the Commission stated in
the Order as a basis for its public interest determination. In doing so they forget that
Western Wireless prevailed on nearly every issue in this case, and that the only detriment
found by the Commission had nothing to do with Western Wireless' service, network, or
satisfaction of the basic ETC criteria. Thus, suggestions that Western Wireless failed to
try its case effectively or r

failed to explai:

network or services (Com. Br., p. 17)

are nothing more than attempts to cloud the issues before the Court. In taking this
approach, the Commission and URTA respond only superficially to Western Wireless'
discussion

of tn.

-disputed record of consumer benefits,

and the Federal

Communications Commission's ("FCC") interpretation of the public interest standard in
47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2).
The Court she

cep focused on the issues presented for appeal, should

recognize the findings and conclusions not challenged on appeal, and su* •

reject

attempts by the Commission and URTA to re-try this case. Western Wireless urges the
Court

iie Order, thereby taking the action necessary to bring the benefits of

competitive universal service to rural consumers in Utah.

2

I.

WESTERN WIRELESS PROPERLY STATES THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW AND SEEKS APPROPRIATE RELIEF
The Commission and URTA misstate the proper standard review and question the

authority of this Court to correct the errors of fact and law made in the Order. Western
Wireless challenged one specific finding of fact, three findings which the Commission
failed to make, and two legal conclusions. WW Br., p. 2. With regard to findings of fact
(both made and not made), Western Wireless has the burden to show the Commission's
Order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or is arbitrary and
capricious.

Id.

With regard to the two legal challenges, this Court reviews those

questions de novo. Id.
The Commission and URTA fail to recognize these separate points of appeal, and
instead attempt to lump all of the issues together and claim there is one mixed question of
fact and law - whether the public interest standard was met. Com. Br., p. 9 (evidence as
a whole does not show a net public interest benefit); URTA Br., p. 11. Moreover, the
Commission and URTA attempt to backfill the analysis by arguing alleged detriments
that were not adopted as findings of fact by the Commission or stated as part of the
Commission's public interest rationale in the Order. Characterizing it this way is an
attempt to avoid having to justify the Commission's specific errors of fact and law
challenged on this appeal. Wliile the public interest factor is clearly a balancing test
(Com. Br., p. 9; URTA Br., p. 10), Western Wireless does not challenge the balancing
per se, it challenges what was balanced.

Meaningful review of the agency's action

3

requires that Western Wireless have the ability to challenge the findings and the
conclusion that determined what would be balanced.
In addition, the Commission and URTA (using identical language and citations)
claim Western Wireless seeks improper relief, and suggests this Court has no power to
make findings 1u

lie Commission or to make partial modifications of the

Commission's Order. Com. Br., p. 7; URTA Br., p. 16. This argument is plainly wrong,
and is based on cases that were not appealed pursuant to the Utah Administrative
Procedures /\( I I",\ PA").3 The APA specifically gives the Court authority in its "review
of formal adjudicative proceedings" to "order agency action," to "order the agency to
exercise its discretion as required by law," or to "set aside or modify" the order appealed
from: Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17(b) (Siipp. ADD-1). This attempt by the Commission
and URTA to ignore the APA and tie this Court's hands on appeal is the first sign they
cannot rebut Western Wireless' arguments on the merits.
I HE COMMISSION AND URTA IGNORE FINDINGS MADE IN THE
ORDER THAT ARE NOT CHALLENGED ON APPEAI,
Reading the briefs of the Commission and URTA one would not guess that
Western Wireless has already been designated as an ETC by the FCC, as well as state
commissions in Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Noi tl 1 Dakota, Soi itl 1 Dakota. Oklal ion la,
2

In its Order, the Commission determined there were no benefits, and one detrimental
impact, making the balancing test quite simple. Western Wireless asks the Court to add
four benefits and eliminate the detrimental impact, which would make the balancing test
just as easy. Thus, the focus of this appeal is not the act of balancing, but instead what is
put on either side of the scale.
3

For Example, in Telecommunications Resellers of Utah v. PSC, the Court's review was
governed by Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16. 747 P.2d 1029, 1030-31 (Utah 1987).

4

Texas, Colorado, California, Nevada, and Kansas. One would most certainly not guess
that Western Wireless has also been designated as an ETC in Utah by the Utah
Commission.

The fact is, however, the Commission in its Order rejected countless

challenges to Western Wireless' Petition and found Western Wireless met the
requirements of Section 214(e)(1) and state law for designation as an ETC, including
provision of services required of all ETCs, and the intent and ability to advertise and
provide those services throughout the requested designated service areas. DI 198, pp. 512, 13-15. The Order thus represents the Commission's rejection of the same claims now
argued on appeal, including that Western Wireless' Petition lacked specificity (DI 172, p.
10; DI 180, pp. 4-5), lacked detail as to its network (DI 180, pp. 5-6; DI 173, pp. 5-7),
and did not allow for appropriate regulatory oversight (DI 172, pp. 15-16), among many
others.
In an attempt to justify the Order's outcome on the public interest question, the
Commission and URTA argue these exact same points, and even suggest these issues
were resolved against Western Wireless below.

For example, URTA states that:

"Because of the dearth of detail, the Commission was justifiably concerned about what it
was Western Wireless intended to offer, at what price and when it intended to offer
services." URTA Br., p. 22; see also Com. Br., p. 11. This is simply untrue - nothing in
the Order suggests the Commission had any such concerns, and it most certainly was not
a factor in the Order's public interest analysis.

4

Moreover, the FCC specifically recognizes that an ETC applicant cannot be expected
to finalize its business plans prior to being designated an ETC. In the Matter of Federal5

The same can be said for the Commission's argument that Western Wireless failed
to show sufficient coverage on its network to provide the services. Com. Br., p. 12; see
also URTA Br., pp. 18-21. To the contrary, the Order specifically found that Western
Wireless demonstrated full coverage on its network in both Qwest exchanges and URTA
study areas in the Petition. DI 198, pp. 11-12. As to the URTA companies' areas, the
Commission found "Western Wireless is licensed and provides the supported services
throughout these companies' study areas." DI 198, p. 12. The Commission dismissed
claims of inadequate coverage in Qwest areas by stating that "to the extent there might be
a few small and discrete areas not within Western Wireless' existing signal coverage,"
Western Wireless would extend its service within a reasonable time. DI 198, p. 11. The
Commission's claim on appeal that lack of coverage or detail regarding the network was
or should be part of the public interest analysis is clearly without merit. Compare also
the Commission's argument that Western Wireless provides substandard service (CB, pp.
10-11) with the Order's findings that Western Wireless meets or exceeds all service
requirements for ETCs (DI 198, pp. 7-11).
By making these arguments the Commission and URTA contradict findings made
in the Order and not challenged on appeal. The Court should reject these assertions as
being contrary to the Commission's Order and beyond the scope of review, and should

State Joint Board on Universal Service, Western Wireless Corporation Petition for
Preemption of an Order of the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission, Declaratory
Ruling, CC Docket No. 96-45, FCC 00-248, ^ 13 (rel. Aug. 10, 2000) ("South Dakota
Order") (Supp. ADD-2).

6

review only the specific findings and conclusions properly challenged by Western
Wireless.
III.

THE COMMISSION AND URTA CAN NOT DISPUTE THAT THE
APPLICATION OF THE FCC'S PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS
REQUIRES DESIGNATION OF WESTERN WIRELESS AS AN ETC
The FCC's recent interpretation of the public interest standard in the Wyoming

Order represents the FCC's binding interpretation of federal law.

The FCC is the

implementing agency for the Act (Sprint Spectrum v. State Corp. Comm'n of Ks., 149
F.3d 1058, 1061 (10 n Cir. 1998)), and its rules and orders can be set aside only by the
federal courts of appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). Applying this FCC standard as required
by federal law eliminates the only adverse impact found in the Order, and recognizes the
benefits of Western Wireless' ETC designation. See WW Br., pp. 32-33. The Court must
acknowledge the FCC's authority to interpret federal law and apply its interpretation of
the public interest standard to correct the Commission's Order.
It is clear from the Wyoming Order that the Commission erred by failing to
consider the general benefits of competition as a factor that supports a public interest
finding. WW Br., pp. 23-25. Like the FCC's Wyoming Order, the Commission should
have recognized that:
[A]n important goal of the Act is to open local telecommunications markets
to competition. Designation of competitive ETCs promotes competition
and benefits consumers in rural and high-cost areas by increasing customer
choice, innovative services, and new technologies.
Wyoming Order, ^ 17 (ADD-80);

see also id f 1 (ADD-73) ("we find that the

designation of Western Wireless as an ETC in those areas served by rural telephone

7

companies serves the public interest by promoting competition"). In failing to recognize
public interest benefits of competition, the Commission left a significant piece out of the
public interest equation.
The Commission also erred by ignoring undisputed record evidence of specific
consumer benefits, including increased subscribership, mobility, and a larger local calling
area. WW Br., pp. 25-32. The FCC's Wyoming Order recognizes the public interest is
served because some consumers will benefit from large local calling areas and the
provision of wireless local loop service. ADD-82. The Wyoming Order thus supports
Western Wireless' argument that these consumer benefits should have been a part of the
Commission's public interest analysis.5
Finally, the FCC interpreted the public interest standard and determined:
Congress was concerned that consumers in areas served by rural telephone
companies continue to be adequately served should the incumbent
telephone company exercise its option to relinquish its ETC designation
under Section 214(e)(4).
Wyoming Order, ^f 18 (ADD-81).

Wliile such relinquishment could be a threat if

competition were not sustainable, the FCC "[rejected] the general argument that rural
areas are not capable of sustaining competition for universal service support,"

and

The Commission and URTA attempt to distinguish the Wyoming Order by claiming
that Western Wireless provided more information to the FCC than it did in this case.
Com. Br., p. 17, fn. 3; URTA Br., p. 18 fn. 6. Nothing in the record of this appeal
supports such a view. The filing made by Western Wireless in the Wyoming docket is
not part of the record on appeal so no comparison can be drawn. In fact, there was a far
greater degree of information and specificity in this proceeding, which involved
discovery, testimony, and three days of hearings. The Wyoming docket was decided only
on written submissions. More importantly, the level of specificity did not play any role
in the FCC's public interest analysis. See Wyoming Order, ^j 16-22 (ADD-80).

8

required rural LECs to prove this detriment based on empirical evidence. Wyoming
Order, 1flf 20, 22 (ADD-81).
The Commission's Order cannot be squared with this FCC public interest analysis
for two reasons. First, the Commission's funding rules for the State Fund guarantee the
URTA companies a statutory rate of return, thereby eliminating any possibility that the
incumbent will be harmed by competition to the detriment of consumers. DI 198, p. 12.
Under this funding scheme, no consumers are put at risk, which is the potential detriment
Section 214(e)(2) was intended to guard against. Wyoming Order, f 20 (ADD-81) ("we
decline to conclude this constitutes a serious risk to consumers") (emphasis added). The
Commission and URTA utterly fail to address this significant point.6 Second, the only
finding the Commission made was that it was possible that the size of the State Fund
might need to increase with the presence of a competitor. DI 198, p. 13. There was no
finding that each URTA area cannot support competition, and instead the Commission's
Order relied acted on a general argument because it might prove to be true.7

6

Although URTA claims the potential for relinquishment should be considered (URTA
Br., p. 35), the Commission made no finding that this was a risk, and the current funding
scheme makes that an impossibility. Moreover, even Dr. Compton testified that
relinquishment was not a realistic threat. DI 300, pp. 24-26.
7

The Commission's brief claims Dr. Compton conducted an analysis of URTA study
areas as was contemplated by the FCC in the Wyoming Order. Com. Br., p. 19. To the
contrary, Dr. Compton looked only generally to whether population growth was fast or
slow, and the Commission made no findings based on this testimony. DI 300, pp. 9-11.
In fact, both DPU/CCS and URTA admitted in their post-hearing briefs that no one
conducted a detailed analysis of whether URTA areas can accommodate competition. DI
172, p. 5 ("We recognize that no detailed empirical study was performed as to the affect
on rural companies for granting ETC status"); DI 180, p. 12 fn.7 ("URTA has not
9

In short, the FCCs public interest analysis properly focuses on the consumer, is
binding, and it is patently inconsistent with the Commission's public interest analysis
below. The Court should recognize the clear path set by the FCC and use that analysis as
a basis to reverse the Commission's Order and grant Western Wireless the relief it has
requested in this proceeding.
IV.

THE COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS OF BENEFITS
OF WESTERN WIRELESS1 DESIGNATION AS AN ADDITIONAL ETC
The Commission erred by finding that there would be no benefits weighing in

favor of designating Western Wireless as an additional ETC in any study area of a rural
telephone company.

The Commission should have recognized and weighed several

undisputed benefits as part of its public interest balancing test based on the record
o

evidence.

Compare DI 222, pp. 622-23 (Dr. Compton agrees there will be specific

benefits of Western Wireless' service). By failing to do so, the Commission ignored
undisputed benefits designating Western Wireless as an ETC.

submitted specific studies showing the impact designating WWC an ETC would have in
the rural companies impacted.").
o

URTA claims the Order did not find there would be "no benefits," but instead found
that unspecified detriments outweighed the benefits. URTA Br., p. 9 fn.2. URTA is
wrong. The Commission neither recognized nor weighed any public interest benefits as
part of its balancing test. DI 198, pp. 12-13. In seeking reconsideration Western
Wireless specifically requested findings of the benefits of competition, increased
subscribership, mobility, and a larger local calling area, but the Commission declined to
reconsider or clarify its Order. DI 210, pp. 3-6.

10

A.

The Order Should Have Reflected General Benefits of Bringing
Competition to URTA Service Areas.

Given the clear mandates of the federal Act, the orders of the FCC, and the Utah
Legislature's mandatory directives, there is simply no way to justify the Commission's
failure to give any consideration to the fact that granting Western Wireless' Petition will
bring benefits of competitive universal service to rural consumers in Utah.

Neither

URTA nor the Commission argues this point, they simply claim that competition should
not be the only factor in the public interest equation. Com. Br., pp. 8-9; URTA Br., p. 8.
Western Wireless agrees that competition should not be the only factor, and has never
claimed otherwise. In fact, Western Wireless quite clearly said that competition "must be
found to be a consideration" in the public interest determination.

WW Br., p. 25

i

(emphasis added). While competition is not the only factor, however, it must be part of
the balancing test, and the Commission's failure to give any weight to this public interest
benefit is clear error.
The FCC's Wyoming Order directs that competition is a goal of the Act and a
benefit that advances the public interest. Wyoming Order, fflf 1, 17 (ADD-73, 80). As
pointed out in Western Wireless' Initial Brief, there was agreement on the record that
competition is presumed to be in the public interest. WW Br., p. 24. This presumption is
consistent with the statutory directives of the Utah Legislature to the Commission. See

11

Utah Code Ann. § 54-86-1.1. For these reasons the Commission erred by failing to find
in its Order that competition is a benefit to be weighed in the public interest analysis.
B.

The Order Should
Subscribership.

Have Reflected

the Benefit

of Increased

The Commission specifically recognized that increased subscribership would be a
benefit that would weigh in favor of the public interest. DI 198, p. 13. Western Wireless
in its Initial Brief pointed to the uncontradicted record evidence that demonstrates
Western Wireless could and would serve consumers who currently do not have landline
telephone service. WW Br., pp. 25-26. The record evidence shows there are consumers
in the URTA study areas who do not have service due to the cost of extending land-line
facilities.

Id.

Because Western Wireless' network could serve those consumers

immediately (without imposing line extension costs) Department witness Dr. Compton
identified that as a "big benefit" of Western Wireless' designation. DI 222, p. 633. The
Commission simply ignored Dr. Compton's testimony when it concluded Western
Wireless would not serve any unserved consumers. DI 198, p. 13.

9

Other state commissions (like the FCC) have also begun their public interest analysis
with a presumption that competition was in the public interest. See, e.g., In the Matter of
GCC License Corporation, Kansas Corporation Comm'n Docket No. 99-GCCZ-156ETC, Order No. 10, p. 4 (May 19, 2000) (competition in rural telephone company service
areas is presumed to be in the public interest) (Supp. ADD-63); Application of WWC
Texas RSA Limited Partnership for Designation as an Eligible Telecommunications
Carrier Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 214(e) and PUC Subst. R. 26.418, Texas Public Utilities
Commission Docket Nos. 22289 and 22295, Order, p. 19 (Oct. 30, 2000) (clear policy in
favor of competitive telecommunications markets); In the Matter of Western Wireless
Holding Co., Inc., Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm'n Docket No. 00K-255T, Decision on
Exceptions, p. 16 (rel. May 4, 2001) ("Both federal and state statutes establish the public
policy of promoting competition in telecommunications markets.") (Supp. ADD-42).
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The Commission does not point to any record evidence supporting its decision, but
instead argues that Western Wireless 1) has large gaps in its coverage, and 2) would
extend service (like the incumbent) only if it were reimbursed dollar-for-dollar for that
line extension by either the customer or a universal service fund. Com. Br., p. 12. First
(and again), the Order itself does not contain any findings of fact to support the argument.
To the contrary, the Commission found Western Wireless has existing service throughout
the URTA territories, and did not find the gaps the Commission now tries to rely on. DI
198, p. 12. Second, the evidence shows that Western Wireless committed to ensuring
strong signal coverage for each such customer without additional charge, even if
engineering means were needed to ensure a strong signal. DI 220, pp. 44-45. The
suggestion that Western Wireless would "draw upon the universal service funds to make
these expansions" (Com. Br., p. 12) mischaracterizes the testimony cited.10
The Court should read Dr. Compton's testimony and should determine that he gave
undisputed testimony that as an ETC Western Wireless will provide universal service to
some Utah residents who do not have it today. DI 222, pp. 632-33. As the FCC has said,
"[a]t the simplest level, increasing the number of people connected to the
telecommunications network makes the network more valuable to all of its users."

10

The testimony of Mr. Blundell relied on by the Commission in its brief is that
Western Wireless would need to receive available subsidies to make its proposed offering
available ubiquitously. In other words, Western Wireless will undertake an ETC's
obligations only if designated an ETC. DI 220, pp. 79-80 (cited Com. Br., p. 12). This
testimony does not support the Commission's reading that Western Wireless would
extend service to a specific individual only upon a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement from a
universal service fund.
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Universal Service Order, ^ 8. An ETC designation that will increase subscribership
furthers the public interest, and should have been considered by the Commission in the
public interest balancing test under Section 214(e)(2).
C.

The Order Should Have Reflected That a Larger Local Calling Area
Would Provide Benefits to Some Consumers.

Western Wireless pointed to undisputed record evidence showing that Western
Wireless would provide a larger local calling area than the incumbents', and showed it
was undisputed that some consumers would benefit from this service option. WW Br.,
pp. 28-30. The Commission challenges this argument only by questioning whether the
local calling area will actually be larger. Com. Br., p. 15. Western Wireless gave clear
testimony that this feature of cellular technology would be a primary way for Western
Wireless to distinguish its service from the incumbents':
We believe, in addition, that the expanded calling area is also another
component of the public interest that will be served here. We can provide
that expanded local calling area today. We do for our cellular customers.
We plan to do this with universal service offering. And as a footnote, we
launched a demonstration project in Regent, North Dakota, earlier this year
using this service, and customers have flocked to the service. Among the
reasons they like it so well in Regent, North Dakota, is the expanded local
calling area.
DI 220, p. 14. Once the Commission concedes Western Wireless will offer a larger local
calling area to consumers, it must concede (as the DPU and CCS witnesses did), that
some consumers will find this option to be beneficial. See WW Br., pp. 29-30. This
furthers the public interest and should have been considered by the Commission.
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D.

The Order Should Have Reflected That a Mobility Component Would
Provide Benefits to Some Consumers.

In its Initial Brief Western Wireless pointed to undisputed record evidence that 1)
Western Wireless would provide a mobility component not currently available from
landline ILECs, and 2) this mobility component would benefit some customers in the
URTA service areas. The Commission's only challenge to this seems to be that "[t]here
was no evidence that the 'mobility' of Western Wireless' proposed equipment ... was
different from the 'mobility' currently offered by means of the cordless phones that are
already available to telephone users of the incumbents' network." Com. Br., p. 16; URTA
Br., p. 27. In fact, the product specifications for the wireless access unit states clearly
that it will provide service to "any remote location where phone service is needed and
cellular networks are available." DI 230. The suggestion, then, that cellular service does
not provide greater mobility than landline service ignores common sense, common
knowledge, and the record evidence. Commission Chair Meacham specifically asked
about the mobility of a wireless unit. DI 220, p. 154. The response (which was not
challenged by contrary evidence) was that in Western Wireless' universal service
offerings a wireless access unit will be able to be used wherever its signal could be
transmitted to and from the nearest cell tower. DI 220, p. 154. This will allow the
customer to roam 25 miles away from their home.

DI 222, p. 610.

A mobility

component that will allow a rural consumer to have access to the network twenty-five
miles from the consumer's home is obviously not identical to what a cordless telephone
provides, and shows the Commission's argument to be a red herring.
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It is undisputed that some consumers will choose to have a universal service
offering with this option, and will be benefited by having this choice available. Because
some consumers will benefit, this is a factor that should have been considered as part of
the public interest examination.
V.

THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE STATE FUND MIGHT INCREASE DUE
TO WESTERN WIRELESS' DESIGNATION IS NOT A FACTOR TO BE
CONSIDERED UNDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST DETERMINATION
PURSUANT TO 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2)
The only negative aspect of Western Wireless' designation stated in the Order was

the possibility that the State Fund might increase with an additional ETC. DI 198, p.
13.11 Western Wireless does not challenge the finding that its designation might increase
the size of the State Fund. Instead, Western Wireless' challenge to this determination is a
legal one - whether it is consistent with the public interest for the Commission to use this
possibility as a detriment of designating a competitive ETC. This challenge then, is one
of law subject to de novo review by this Court.12
A.

The Order's Public Interest Determination Frustrates Federal Law.

The Commission seeks to justify its protection of monopoly earners to the
detriment of competition by claiming that Congress recognized the states' "preeminent

As discussed supra, the Commission made only one finding of a detriment, and none
others. The Commission's claim that the record shows "overwhelming detriments
compared to benefits" must be disregarded as not based on any findings in the Order.
Com. Br., p. 18.
12

URTA is wrong to state there was a finding that designation "would result in a
significantly increased burden on the Fund." URTA Br., p. 22. The Order reflects no
such finding and the Order instead denied the Petition in the URTA areas "because of the
possible negative impact." DI 198, p. 13 (emphasis added).
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role and authority" on universal service matters. Com. Br., p. 22. However, the public
interest standard is in a federal statute that governs federal universal service dollars. See
DI 198, p. 7 (ADD-7). The United States Supreme Court has recognized "there is no
doubt ... that if the federal courts believe a state commission is not regulating in
accordance with federal policy they may bring it to heel." AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
BcL, 119 S. Ct. 721, 730 n.6 (1999). Here, in assisting the FCC's administration of this
federal program, the Commission cannot ignore or frustrate federal goals under the guise
of the "public" interest. Because the Commission's Order does just this, it cannot stand.13
In a comparable situation the North Dakota Commission's public interest
determination under Section 214(e)(2) was reversed as being inconsistent with federal
law. The North Dakota Commission had determined that the public interest standard for
a federal ETC applicant was not met because there was no state universal service fund,
and it speculated that federal universal service funding was not sufficient in rural
telephone company areas.

On appeal, the district court reversed the North Dakota

Commission's application of Section 214(e)(2) as being inconsistent with federal policies:

Some states have imposed a separate public interest test for receipt of state funds,
which arguably could consider state goals not mandated by federal law. There is no State
Fund public interest requirement in Utah. Under Commission Rule R746-360-7, a
competitive earner is eligible for state funding by 1) being designated a federal ETC and
2) being in compliance with Commission rules and orders. Even if there were a State
Fund public interest requirement, the Utah Legislature created the State Fund to support
competition without advantage to any carrier, to be sufficient to fund competitive
universal service, and to be consistent with the federal Act. Utah Code Ann. § 54-8615(4)(c), (5), and 9. See also WW Br., pp. 24, 34. These legislative mandates are
inconsistent with the Order's public interest rationale.
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Federal case law indicates that in regards to federal funding mechanisms,
the PSC cannot determine, or rely on its own determination, that the FCCs
universal service mechanisms are not sufficient to provide for competition
among universal service providers.... The Telecommunications Act of
1996 contemplates that separate universal service funds would be
established at both the state and federal levels. The FCC has established
mechanisms for the collection and disbursement of monies for the Federal
Universal Service Fund which are independent of any state fund. By
denying Western Wireless access to federal subsidies based on North
Dakota's failure to create a separate state fund, the PSC is frustrating the
purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Western Wireless Corp. v. Rural Telephone Company Group et al., Civil No. 00-C-1800,
Slip Op. at 3-4 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Nov. 13, 2000) (citations omitted) (Supp. ADD-24). The
Colorado Commission has similarly determined that the operation of its state fund rules
cannot be allowed to frustrate federal law. In the Matter of Western Wireless Holding
Co., Inc., Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm'n Docket No. 00K-255T, Decision on Exceptions,
p. 8 (rel. May 4, 2001) (rejecting an interpretation of its rules that would conflict with 47
U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)) (Supp. ADD-34). This Court should similarly hold that the
Commission cannot ignore or frustrate goals and policies of the federal Act.
In Western Wireless' Initial Brief it explained that Section 253(a) of the Act
prohibits a state from taking action that prohibits an entity from providing any
telecommunications service.
253(a)

cannot

be

WW Br., pp. 18-19. The Commission claims Section

implicated

because

Western

Wireless

telecommunications services without being designated an ETC.

can

still

provide

Com. Br., p. 23.

However, the FCC has ruled that Section 253(a) is violated where a state commission
imposes a requirement that "[deprives] customers in high-cost areas of the benefits of
competition by insulating the incumbent LEC from competition." South Dakota Order, ]\
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12 (Supp. ADD-7); see also Kansas Order, ^ 8 (ADD-67) (state can violate Section
253(a) by keeping a competitor out of the universal service market).

The Order's

conclusion that the public interest is not served by competition that might increase the
size of the State Fund violates Section 253(a) as interpreted by the FCC.
Western Wireless also argued that the effect of the Order was to burden federal
universal service mechanisms in violation of Section 253(f).

WW Br., p. 36. The

Commission asserts that Section 253(f) is violated only if the Commission hinders the
collection of universal service assessments. Com. Br., p. 26. The term "federal universal
service mechanisms," however, clearly includes assessments, regulations governing
ETCs, and distributions of funds to earners. Universal Service Order, ^ 816. It is quite
clear that rejecting competition for federal universal service dollars based on a fear that
the State Fund might increase in some unspecified amount burdens the ability of federal
mechanisms to have their intended effect, and thereby violates Section 253(f).
In essence, the Utah Commission has (under the guise of the public interest)
refused to allow competition for federal universal service funding because it does not
want its State Fund to subsidize competition in rural telephone areas. This violates
federal law and clear federal policies, and cannot be a factor in a federal public interest
test.
B.

The Order's Public Interest Analysis Favors Incumbent Monopoly
Providers In Violation Of Federal Law.

The Commission's Order makes clear an intention to fund incumbent monopolists
first, and exclude competitors from the universal service market in rural telephone
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company areas. In fact, it is unclear whether the Commission would ever designate a
competitive ETC in a rural telephone area. This clearly an advantage to the incumbent,
which violates the principle of competitive neutrality.
The Commission misunderstands the "competitive neutrality" requirement of
Section 253(b). Com Br., p. 24. Western Wireless does not suggest that any earner
should receive universal service funding, but instead that the rules for designation and
funding cannot favor the incumbent over the competitor. This is exactly what the FCC
said in its Kansas Order: "Section 253(b) cannot save a state legal requirement from
preemption pursuant to sections 253(a) and (d) unless, inter alia, the requirement is
competitively neutral with respect to, and as between, all of the participants and potential
participants in the market at issue."

Kansas Order, ^ 10 (ADD-68).

See also RT

Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 201 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming
preemption of Wyoming State rule that awarded incumbent LECs the advantage of
continued monopoly status to the detriment of competitors).
By guaranteeing incumbents success in the marketplace, and denying competition
because of that guarantee, the Commission's Order is not competitively neutral and
violates federal law.
C.

The Commission Did Not Find Any Other Detriments Associated With
Western Wirelessy Designation As An ETC.

As discussed supra, the Commission's Order was based only on a single
indefensible detriment. No findings support claims that ETC designation would lead to
an increase in average costs or losses in network economics (Com. Br., p. 18), or that
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Western Wireless provides inferior service (URTA Br., p. 33). Significantly, URTA has
not cross-appealed on these issues. Thus, once the Court reverses this sole indefensible
detriment in the Order and adds findings of benefits of Western Wireless' designation, the
balancing test will clearly fall in favor of designating Western Wireless as an additional
ETC in the areas served by the URTA companies. That relief is appropriate and allowed
bytheAPA.
VI.

THE COMMISSION'S RATE CAP FOR STATE FUND PURPOSES IS
UNENFORCEABLE AS TO A CMRS PROVIDER.
A.

Section 332(c)(3)(A) Clearly Overrides Sections 214 and 254.

The arguments of the Commission and URTA on the applicability of Section
332(c)(3)(a) to ETCs is quite odd.

Incumbent earners opposing competition from

Western Wireless generally claim that Western Wireless must be a state certificated local
exchange earner to be an ETC. These carriers take the position that Section 214(e)
overcomes Section 332(c)(3)'s ban on entry regulation. No incumbent carrier, however,
has ever won this argument. In addition, the FCC has issued clear authority on this point.
We re-emphasize that the limitation on a state's ability to regulate rates and
entry by wireless service carriers under section 332(1)(3) does not allow
states to deny wireless carriers ETC status.
In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Seventh Report and
Order and Thirteenth Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 96-45, CC Docket No.
96-45, FCC 99-119, t 72 (rel. May 28, 1999). See also Universal Service Order, ^ 147
("Nothing in section 214(e)(1), however, requires that a carrier be subject to the
jurisdiction of a state commission in order to be designated an [ETC].").
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Just recently, the Colorado Commission determined that Section 332(c)(3)(A)
prohibited any requirement that a CMRS provider be certificated to be eligible for state
universal service funding:
Federal law (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)) (no State or local government shall
have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any
CMRS providers) prohibits the states from imposing a certification
requirement on wireless providers; therefore, the Commission has no legal
authority to certificate wireless carriers. Qwest's and CTA's interpretation
of § 40-15-208(2)(a), C.R.S., would, in effect, preclude wireless providers
such as Western Wireless from providing service as EPs within the state.

[A]n interpretation that would preclude wireless providers from
participating in the [Colorado state fund] as EPs would likely violate 47
U.S.C. § 253 . . . .
In the Matter of Western Wireless Holding Co., Inc., Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm'n
Docket No. 00K-255T, Decision on Exceptions, pp. 8-9 (rel. May 4, 2001) (Supp. ADD34).
The opposition to Western Wireless in Utah raised this same issue - the
Commission was urged to impose a requirement that Western Wireless obtain a state
certificate to be an ETC because Section 214(e) overcomes Section 332(c)(3)(A). See,
e.g., DI 248, p. 10; DI 222, p. 509.14
The Commission, however, agreed with Western Wireless on this point and did
not impose a certification obligation as a condition of ETC designation. DI 198, p. 15.
14

Interestingly, URTA's initial pre filed testimony conceded Western Wireless could not
be subjected to any rate and entry oversight. DI 292, p. 6. URTA's argument on appeal
(URTA Br., p. 6) is both unsupported and contradicts its position below.
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However, after agreeing in the Order that Section 332(c)(3)(A) preempts certification
requirements, the Commission nevertheless argues that Section 332(c)(3)(a) does not
preempt rate regulation. Com Br., pp. 28-29. The Commission's argument that Section
214(e) overcomes Section 332(c)(3)(A) rate regulation is contrary to FCC mandates,
court and other Commission decisions, and its own Order. The real question, is not
whether Section 332(c)(3)(A) overcomes Section 214(e). The question (answered below)
is whether a rate cap on a wireless ETC is rate regulation prohibited by Section
332(c)(3)(A).
B.

A Rate Cap Is Rate Regulation For The Purposes Of Section
332(c)(3)(A).

As argued in Western Wireless' Initial Brief, a rate cap is clearly rate regulation,
no matter the context. WW Br., pp. 39-41. The Commission's only real argument is that
the Sprint Spectrum case held that assessing universal service contributions is not rate
regulation, and thus does not violate Section 332(c)(3)(A). Sprint Spectrum v. Kansas
City SMSA, 149 F.3d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). However, the Sprint Spectrum case is
not implicated here. The treatment of a universal service assessment is far different than
the Commission's Order requiring Western Wireless to price its service at a specific rate.
A universal service requirement that sets a specific rate for a CMRS provider clearly
constitutes rate regulation.

As was decided in Cellular Telecommunications Indus.

Assoc, v. F.C.C., a state can set rate and entry requirements on wireless universal service
providers only after meeting the "substitutability" exception of Section 332(c)(3)(A),
which has not happened here. 168 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussed in WW

23

Brief, pp. 41-42). This precedent requires the Court to strike the rate cap imposed by the
Commission through the State Fund rules.
C.

In A Competitive Market Affordable Rates Are Accomplished By
Market Forces And Explicit Subsidies, Not By Rate Caps.

Both the Commission and URTA argue that a rate cap is the only way for the
Commission to meet its obligation that basic local service rates be "affordable." Com.
Br., p. 29; URTA Br., p. 39. Once again, the Commission and URTA fundamentally
misunderstand how competitive markets work. Congress made clear in the Act that there
should be "specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve
and advance universal service." 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5) (emphasis added).

Sufficient

funding is funding that leads to affordable rates. Universal Service Order, ^f 2. The Utah
Legislature established its State Fund to provide "sufficient" funding to allow competitors
to provide service at affordable rates. Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15(9). As competition
pushes the price of services down and prompts carriers to become more efficient
(Wyoming Order, ^ 13, 17, 22), federal and state universal service subsidies are then
applied to reduce what the consumer pays to an affordable level.
It is a fundamental truism of American democracy that government cannot keep
the cost of bread low simply by mandating a maximum price. Instead, government
ensures competition among fanners, millers, and bakers, and grocers, and allows the
market to produce an efficient, affordable price. The Commission and URTA are wrong
to suggest that a rate cap is the only way to achieve affordable pricing. This Court,
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unlike the Commission, should recognize the benefits and requirements of bringing
universal service competition to its citizens.
VII.

THE COMMISSION FAILED TO FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THEAPA
Western Wireless maintains that the Commission established a "rule" without a

formal rulemaking when it mandated that each incumbent's rates (which were not part of
the record) represents the "Affordable Base Rate" under the State Fund rules. WW Br.,
pp 42-45. The Commission's response is not persuasive - the Commission does not have
carte blanche to create rules in the context of an administrative adjudication. Com. Br.,
pp. 33-34. The Affordable Base Rate was not put at issue in this case, did not need to be
determined, and is of general applicability to all ETCs and prospective ETCs.

An

Affordable Base Rate should be established on record evidence in accordance with the
rulemaking provisions mandated by the Legislature.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should reverse the Order as requested, and grant
the relief sought by Western Wireless.
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